

The background of the slide features the logo of the International Maritime Organization (IMO). It consists of a white globe with latitude and longitude lines, surrounded by a laurel wreath. The text is overlaid on this logo.

# **CARGO & SUPPLY CHAIN SECURITY**

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**Head**

**Maritime Security Section**

**IMO**

IMO

# What is IMO ?

**Safer** shipping

**Cleaner** oceans

***“IMO: SAFE, SECURE AND  
EFFICIENT SHIPPING ON  
CLEAN OCEANS”***



INTERNATIONAL MARITIME ORGANIZATION  
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL  
LONDON  
2011

# Maritime Security



# Santa Maria – January 1961



# Achille Lauro – October 1985



# USS Cole – October 2000



# Limburg – October 2002



# Superferry 14 – February 2004



AP / Aaron Favila



**11 September 2001**



Spencer Platt / Getty Images

# Terrorism & WMD



# Diplomatic Conference December 2002

Conference resolution 1



Chapter V

Chapter XI

Chapter XI-1

Special measures to  
enhance maritime

**SAFETY**

Chapter XI-2

Special measures to  
enhance maritime

**SECURITY**

# Diplomatic Conference

## December 2002

Conference resolution 2

International Ship &  
Port Facility Security Code  
(ISPS Code)

Part A – Mandatory

Part B - Recommendatory



Annex  
International Code for the Security  
of Ships and of Port Facilities

Preamble

1 The Diplomatic Conference on Maritime Security held in London in December 2002 adopted new provisions in the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, 1974 and this Code\* to enhance maritime security. These new requirements form the international framework through which ships and port facilities can co-operate to detect and deter acts which threaten security in the maritime transport sector.

2 Following the tragic events of 11th September 2001, the twenty-second session of the Assembly of the International Maritime Organization ("the Organization"), in November 2001, unanimously agreed to the development of new measures relating to the security of ships and of port facilities for adoption by a Conference of Contracting Governments to the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, 1974 (known as the Diplomatic Conference on Maritime Security) in December 2002. Preparation for the Diplomatic Conference was entrusted to the Organization's Maritime Safety Committee (MSC) on the basis of submissions made by Member States, intergovernmental organizations and non-governmental organizations in consultative status with the Organization.

3 The MSC, at its first extraordinary session, held also in November 2001, in order to accelerate the development and the adoption of the appropriate security measures, established an MSC Intersessional Working Group on Maritime Security. The first meeting of the MSC Intersessional Working Group on Maritime Security was held in February 2002 and the outcome of its discussions was reported to, and considered by, the seventy-fifth session of the MSC in March 2002, when an *ad hoc* Working Group was established to further develop the proposals made. The seventy-fifth session of the MSC considered the report of that Working Group and recommended that work should be taken forward through a further MSC Intersessional Working Group, which was held in September 2002. The seventy-sixth session of the MSC considered the outcome of the September 2002 session of the MSC Intersessional Working Group and the further work undertaken by the MSC Working Group held in conjunction with

\* The complete name of the Code is the International Code for the Security of Ships and of Port Facilities. The abbreviated name of this Code, as referred to in regulation XI-2/1 of SOLAS 74 as amended, is the International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code, or in short, the ISPS Code.



...to detect  
& deter acts  
that  
threaten  
security

# **ISPS Code section A/16 - PFSP**


- **measures designed to prevent weapons, dangerous substances and devices intended for use against persons, ships or ports and the carriage of which is not authorized, from being introduced into the port facility or on board a ship (section A/16.3.1) and to include measures designed to ensure effective security of cargo and the cargo handling equipment at the port facility (section A/16.3.12).**

# Ship Security Measures



**SECURITY  
PLAN**

# Port Facility Security Measures





# Rationale

- Risk management activity
- Appropriate security measures
- Threat assessment
- Standard framework of functional security requirements for ships and port facilities
  - change security level
  - change vulnerability of ships / port facilities

# **Will the ISPS Code work ?**

- **Consider the wider picture**
- **Government responsibility**
- **National legislation and programmes**
- **Co-ordinated response**
- **Threat assessment**
- **Training and guidance**

# Assessment of ISPS in Ports



**MSC.1/Circ.1192**

**Revised May 2006**


- Appendix 1: Voluntary self-assessment questionnaire for Contracting Governments
- Appendix 2: Voluntary self-assessment tool for port facility security



# **Limitations of using SOLAS**


# Co-operation IMO/ILO

ILO/IMO Code of practice on security in ports



# Co-operation IMO / WCO

## WCO 'SAFE' Framework of Standards



- **Customs to Customs Pillar (11 Standards)**
- **Customs to Business Pillar (6 Standards)**
- **Seal integrity programme**
- **AEO guidelines**

**[www.wcoomd.org](http://www.wcoomd.org)**

# Methodologies

- **ISO 20858 on Maritime port facility security assessments and security plan development**
- **ISO 28000 series on supply chain security**

# THE IMO'S SUPPRESSION OF UNLAWFUL ACTS (SUA) CONVENTIONS AND PROTOCOLS 1988 AND 2005







**ACHILLE LAURO**



**SO SAN, December 2002**

# 1988 SUA Convention

- Seizing/control of ships
- Acts of violence against person on board
- Destruction or damage to ship or cargo
- Placement of devices or substances to destroy or damage ship
- Damage/destruction of maritime navigational facilities
- False information



# Gaps in SUA 1988

- Does not address modern threats of terrorism to the safety of shipping and persons on board
- Does not identify potentially appropriate measures, such as boarding and searching a ship, to interrupt the commission of a SUA offense

# Threats Not Covered in SUA

- Use of ship and their cargoes as weapons
- Sabotage or hijacking of a high interest vessel
- WMD importation by container or other clandestine means
- Mining of critical ports by swimmer or small boat
- Sabotage of critical infrastructure
- Increase in drug or migrant trafficking to fund terrorist activities

# Revision of SUA Convention



**So San**

**In December 2002 Spanish and United States warships boarded SO SAN in the Gulf of Aden and found Scud missiles and chemicals bound from North Korea to the Yemen**

**No basis in international law for seizure of the vessel or its cargo and it was released**

**In 2003 the United States established Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI)**





# Revision of SUA Convention

SUA Conference, London, October 2005

- Adopted new offences (proposed Article 3 *bis, ter & quater*)
- Adopted new provisions allowing boarding of ships on the high seas (proposed Article 8 *bis*)

# Revision of SUA Convention: Article 3 *bis* Offences

- Terrorism offenses on board or against ships or platforms
- Non-proliferation offenses
- Transporting terrorist fugitives
- Threats, conspiracy, attempts

# “Transport”

*Transport* is defined as initiating, arranging or exercising control, including decision-making authority, over the movement of a person or item

# Non-proliferation Offenses

- **Consistent with nonproliferation obligations in UNSC Resolution 1540**
  - Paragraph 2: adopt and enforce effective laws against WMD proliferation by non-State actors
  - Paragraph 3(d): adopt and enforce national export, trans-shipment and re-export controls; establish penalties for violations



# CARGO RELATED THREATS

# Cargo related threats

- Cargo theft

# Stowaways & Illegal Migrants




# Drugs & Weapons Smuggling





# Sabotage & Arson



# Undeclared and/or incorrectly packed dangerous goods



# Terrorism & WMD



# *Constraints on security*



# Constraints on security

- Volume carried  
000s TEU annually
- Diversity in size,  
density and nature  
of goods
- “Just in time”  
deliveries



# **Cargo Security - Aim**

**To devise a system to prevent explosive or incendiary devices or WMD being placed on board ships through:**

- Concealment in prepared consignments**
- Access to ships via port facilities**

# Basic principles of cargo security

- Impractical to screen all cargo
- Bulk cargo security relies on access control at point of loading




# Basic principles of cargo security

- Containerized and pre-packaged cargo is easier to screen before consolidation, stuffing and delivery to port facility





# Basic principles of cargo security




- Containers and bulk cargo cannot be screened on board!!


# Preventive Security

- **Prevention of interference at source  
i.e. secure when packed**
- **Demonstrable maintenance of  
security**
- **Screening of cargo whose security  
cannot be easily determined**

# The Regulated Agent Concept



# The way forward?



# **2002 SOLAS Conference resolution 9**

- ***“agrees that the Convention should be amended, if and when appropriate, to give effect to relevant decisions taken by the WCO and endorsed by the Contracting Governments to the Convention insofar as these relate to the carriage of closed CTUs by sea”***

# **MSC/FAL.1/ Circ.1**

**Member States developing guidance on the implementation of the FAL Convention and SOLAS chapter XI-2 and the ISPS Code, in the context of the SAFE Framework of Standards], should include statements to the effect that:**

**.1 SOLAS chapter XI-2 and the ISPS Code sufficiently set out the requirements on ships and port facilities with respect to the security and facilitation of the movement of closed cargo transport units and of freight containers transported by ships, taking into account the appropriate references in the ISPS Code;**

# **MSC/FAL.1/ Circ.1**

- .2 the WCO has primacy over supply chain security, with IMO's role being limited to those aspects related to ships and port facilities;**
- .3 port facilities and ships are not responsible for maintaining the physical integrity of closed cargo transport units and of freight containers other than those in their custody;**

# **MSC/FAL.1/ Circ.1**



- .4 the SAFE Framework of Standards including the risk-based cargo security strategy set out therein, should be taken into account in policies and practices with respect to the FAL Convention, SOLAS chapter XI-2 and the ISPS Code; and**
- .5 communication, co-ordination and co-operation at both national and local levels, between ships, port facilities, Customs and other competent authorities are of the utmost importance.**



# Maintaining Security

- **Training of personnel**
- **Access control**
- **Awareness procedures**


# Dangerous Goods




# Dangerous Goods

## UN Model Regulations

- Chapter 1.3:  
Training
- Chapter 1.4:  
Security  
Provisions



# Dangerous Goods



## IMDG Code

- Chapter 1.3: Training
- Chapter 1.4: Security Provisions
- **Recommendatory**

# **IMDG Code – Security Provisions**

- **Introduction**
- **General provisions for companies, ships and port facilities**
- **General provisions for shore-side personnel**
- **Security training**
- **Provisions for high consequence dangerous goods**

# QUESTIONS ?

[www.imo.org](http://www.imo.org)

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