



Projects Counteract (FP6) and INSECTT (Marco Polo)


Pragmatic approaches to enhancing security

Martin Burkhardt

UIRR, International Union of Combined Transport Companies




UIRR: 19 European CT operators



Shifting road traffic to rail:
11,000 truck-loads daily in 500 trains

5.9 mill. TEU/year





Terrorist threats must be taken seriously.

But we must take care that the military and civil measures taken to increase security do not assume proportions which show effects that terrorist attacks never could have had: namely to burden the world economy with costs and administrative barriers which could lead to a recession. **Security risk must be put into perspective:**

Terrorist attack	Victims	Traffic victims (/year/country)
New York (9/11/01)	2997	41 975
Madrid (11/3/04)	191	5 840
London (7/07/05)	56	3 285
OECD countries	[ratio of] 1	[to] 390



Costs of security: DNV study 2005



Transport elements


Element	Element	Element	Element	Element
...

Terrorist intervention methods

Terrorist intervention method	Description
1. Inevitable	Inevitable intervention
2. Explosion - Detonator - charge TNT or equivalent	Explosion - Detonator - charge TNT or equivalent
3. Explosion - Gas TNT or equivalent	Explosion - Gas TNT or equivalent
4. Explosion - 300kg TNT or equivalent	Explosion - 300kg TNT or equivalent
5. Poison attack	Dispersion/release of poison
6. Biological/chemical attack	Dispersion/release of biological/chemical agents
7. Terrorist threat	An attack threat such as a terrorist alert
8. Nuclear	Nuclear device resulting in nuclear explosion
9. Nuclear Dust	Dirty bomb resulting in nuclear radiation
10. Hijacking	Seizure control of a ship, aircraft or vehicle
11. Mechanical/Physical intervention	Blockade or physical obstruction
12. Electronic attack/cyber crime	Hardware or disruption of computer systems or electronics

Terrorist intervention database

Security risk matrix



Problematic holistic approach

- Basis maximum scenario: nuclear attack
- Missing Cost-Benefit-Analysis
- No comparison of efficiency of measures
- Costs of measures 48 billion EUR plus 36 yearly for EU
- Security measures = increase quality ⇒ free of charge ???

But basis for COM(2006), 79 “Enhancing Supply Chain Security” with proposal for a regulation and scheme for “Secure Operator Status” (refused by industry, MR and EP)



The approach of total securing of the supply chain and infrastructure is inefficient!

- **Improve security on the transport network at its external borders (authorities)**
- **Proactive and coordinated approach of the intelligence service, police force and custom authorities**
- **Moderate general provisions for the economy**
- **Specific and targeted measures for “weak links” with financial solidarity by the community**




Marco Polo: INSECTT (common learning action) Intermodal Security on Combined Transport Terminals

Security recommendations

36 related to 4 fields:

1. Aims/approach
2. Risk analysis
3. Security plan
4. Training



Recipients

Public Authorities

Infrastructure Owners

CT operators


Rail / road operators

Emergency service



Marco Polo: INSECTT

Risk analysis principles



Differentiation is essential

- Only priorities allow to **balance benefits versus costs** (including externalities)
- A prioritized, risk-based approach is a critical element to determine practical, **affordable solutions**
- Once the risks are identified, assessed and prioritized, relevant action plans can be developed to **mitigate the risk**



Marco Polo Project INSECTT

Risk analysis

Vulnerability factors


Sensitiveness
(Dangerous goods)

Localisation

Existing measures
(security level)

Context
(alert level)

Risk exposure scale



	Densité de Population résidente [P]	Installations collectives et/ou stratégiques [I]	Infrastructures de Transport [T]	Effet domino potentiel [D]	Environnement [E]
<i>Niveau 5</i>					
<i>Niveau 4</i>					
<i>Niveau 3</i>					
<i>Niveau 2</i>					
<i>Niveau 1</i>					




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Risk classification

Theoretical model: matrix

Location Goods	ISOLATED	SENSITIVE	VERY SENSITIVE
NORMAL	I-(II) A	I-(II-III) A	I-(II-III-V) H
SENSITIVE	I-II A	I-II-III H	I-II-III-IV-(V) VH
VERY SENSITIVE	I-II-III H	I-II-III-IV-(V) VH	I-II-III-IV-V VH





Marco Polo Project INSECTT Awareness campaign and training



CEMAT

novatrans

**kombi
verkehr**

**ADRIA
KOMBI**

HUPAC



**Security: our
common objective**

Sûreté: notre objectif commun
Sicherheit: unser gemeinsames Ziel
Security: una nostro obbiettivo commune



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TRW



**Cluster Of User Networks in Transport and Energy
Relating to Anti-terrorist ACTivities
(FP6 Coordination Action)**

**Recommendations for
Energy, Passenger and Freight Transport
The User plays a key role
Targeted Studies**



Use of Official Documents for Employment in the Surface Transport Sector

- Passport
- Driving licence
- ID card
- *Birth certificate*
- *Proof of registration in your respective community*
- *Work permits*
- *Official Professional licences (union licence, organisation licence etc..)*
- *Police declaration upon past behaviour / record*



Recommendations for EU and national legislation
Information exchange, raising awareness and training for transport companies...





High Consequence Freight and establishing Security Zones in urban areas for Protection against Terrorist Attacks using Freight Transport to deliver Weapons

General Objective

- PROPOSE AN INNOVATIVE STRATEGY BASED ON PROBABILITY RATHER THAN POSSIBILITY

Scope

- Identify potential target areas based on their attractiveness to terrorist actions using freight transport as a means.
- Analyse threats & scenarios
- Determine the required level of protection and mitigation means
- Identify and map potential consequences of attacks to better understand the geographic extent of an urban security zone in terms of targets, damage and casualties.



Multi-criteria analysis (MCA) to establish attractiveness indices [0,1] for potential locations.

Assessment Criteria


Public Impact

Economic impact


Social and political impact

Infrastructure

News Worthiness



City scenarios - Brussels






FT15 Communication structure in Freight transport



- A reciprocal system to exchange information and knowledge between LEAs (Law Enforcement Authorities) and Industry.



Transport Industry



- Training
- ALERTS

Authorities

- Incidents
- Suspicious actions, objects and people





FT15: TAPA Incident Information Service



- 8166 incidents, 1125 of them major incidents.
- Total loss value of more than €603m (excluding recoveries).
- Practical tool for analysis.
- Information from Manufacturers, insurers, and LEAs.
- IIS Google Earth Tools with colors for different types of incident and routes.



■ The TAPA IIS Alerts & Tools:

- Recovered Goods Database
- IIS Alerts Board
- SOCA Alerts
- Incidents Trends Alerts

2 of 5 Objects 20 attributes	2	5
Key	2	5
Date of finding/recovery	22.04.2008	05.09.2008
Date of reporting to db	22.04.2008	05.09.2008
Location of finding/recovery		
Country	United Kingdom	France
City / Area	Yorkshire	Paris
Details of finding/recovery circumstances	no details given	Police seizure
Commodity type	Consumer electronics	Unspecified
Description	80 - 100 items of GALANZ air conditioning units recovered.	Make-up (Eyeliner, Lipstick, Lipgloss)
Special signs/markings		Chanel
ID numbers		
Picture 01		
Picture 02		





Different safety and security levels per mode road open access – rail access restricted






Comparative study necessary: Security Across Land Transport

Avoid that authorities require measures where easy to implement
Avoid that security measures distort competition
⇒ **Risk based approach also across modes**




✓ **Marshalling yards**
✓ **Stations**

✓ **Loading and unloading areas**
✓ **Parking areas**



✓ **CT Terminals**

Static : stationery situations



Dynamic : traffic flow situations



Conclusions enhancing security

- **Exchange of best practices**
- **Share experience within transport industry**
- **Everybody must concentrate on his role and what he can contribute to enhance security**
- **Responsibilities of all actors in the transport chain and the authorities must be defined**
- **See safety and security in general to protect life, vehicles and freight**
- **Risk analysis for all modes and all actors**
- **Cost benefit analysis for all measures and taking both into account: safety and security**